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Abstract
Magicians’ forcing techniques allow them to covertly influence spectators’ choices. We used a type of force (Position Force) 
to investigate whether explicitly informing people that they are making a decision results in more deliberate decisions. The 
magician placed four face-down cards on the table in a horizontal row, after which the spectator was asked to select a card by 
pushing it forward. According to magicians and position effects literature, people should be more likely to choose a card in 
the third position from their left, because it can be easily reached. We manipulated whether participants were reminded that 
they were making a decision (explicit choice) or not (implicit choice) when asked to select one of the cards. Two experiments 
confirmed the efficiency of the Position Force—52% of participants chose the target card. Explicitly informing participants 
of the decision impairs the success of the force, leading to a more deliberate choice. A range of awareness measures illus-
trates that participants were unaware of their stereotypical behaviours. Participants who chose the target card significantly 
underestimated the number of people who would have chosen the same card, and felt as free as the participants who chose 
another card. Finally, we tested an embodied-cognition idea, but our data suggest that different ways of holding an object 
do not affect the level of self-control they have over their actions. Results are discussed in terms of theoretical implications 
regarding free will, Wegner’s apparent mental causation, choice blindness and reachability effects.
Introduction
We like the feeling of being in control of our thoughts and 
our actions, and yet many of our behaviours are system-
atically influenced by external and internal factors (Ariely, 
2008; Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 
1996; Loewenstein, 1996). Likewise, our thoughts are 
often less unique than we intuitively believe them to be, 
and research on population stereotypes illustrates that most 
people will choose or think about similar things or objects 
when asked to make a decision (French, 1992; Grimmer 
& White, 1986; Marks & Kammann, 1980). Understanding 
the external factors that influence our behaviours may help 
individuals make more informed and freer choices (Appour-
chaux, 2014).
Baumeister suggested that free will is predominantly 
associated with cognitive processes involving conscious 
and controlled activity (i.e. System 2), rather than the 
nonconscious and automatic processes associated with 
System 1 (Baer, Kaufman, & Baumeister, 2008; Kahne-
man et al., 2002). Accordingly, a more useful view of free 
will is to think in terms of autoregulation and self-control 
mechanisms, a perspective that allows us to take advantage 
of the parameters influencing our thoughts and actions dur-
ing our day to day lives. Magicians are masters at deception 
and creating the illusion of conscious will, and they use a 
wide range of forcing techniques, to give spectators the illu-
sion that they freely and consciously chose a card, which 
in reality is predetermined by the conjurer (Kuhn, Amlani, 
& Rensink, 2008). This paper uses a forcing technique to 
investigate whether explicitly informing people that they are 
making a decision leads to a more deliberate decision.
Forcing Techniques
Forcing refers to conjuring techniques which allow magi-
cians to covertly influence a spectator’s choice or its out-
come (Pailhès & Kuhn, 2019; Pailhès & Kuhn, submitted). 
These techniques are often used to create the illusion of 
precognition or mind reading and magicians have extensive 
real-world experience in manipulating the decisions people 
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make. Back in 1894, Alfred Binet investigated magicians’ 
deceptive craft scientifically, and he observed that conjurers 
exploit spectators’ “laziness” without them becoming aware 
of it (Binet, 1894). In other words, conjurers intuitively 
try to manipulate the spectator into using more automatic 
cognitive processes, which are easily exploited to trick the 
mind. He further noted that magicians often use circum-
stantial influences to push a person to act in a predictable 
way. Nowadays, we refer to these processes as automatic 
behaviours, which often rely on heuristics, or a System 1 
type of thinking (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman et al., 2002). 
By observing conjurers performing tricks, Binet noted that if 
you are presented with three different objects, one alongside 
the other, most people choose the middle one. He also points 
out that this is probably due to the ease by which people 
execute certain grasping actions. Likewise, he noted that 
when people are presented with a sheet of paper that has 
been divided into 16 equal size squares, and they are asked 
to draw a dot into one of them, most people will choose the 
middle squares. As he writes, “there is therefore a kind of 
attraction exerted by the centre of the figure. Probably also 
because they provide more convenience to the hand.” (Binet, 
1894, p.150/151). Magicians frequently exploit these types 
of cognitive heuristics and population stereotypes to force a 
decision (Annemann, 1940; Banachek, 2002; Jones, 1994). 
Magicians’ real-world experience and expertise in perform-
ing these tricks for large audiences have allowed them to 
identify psychological factors that enhance the possibility 
of the spectator selecting the forced item.
Several other papers have investigated forces that rely 
on different techniques and it is likely that spectators sim-
ply choose the easiest option. The “Classic Force” relies 
on the timing in which the magician is handling the deck 
of cards while asking the spectator to pick a card (Shalom 
et al., 2013). Shalom et al. showed that most people pick the 
card which is subtly handled by the magician who physi-
cally restricts the choice. Olson, Amlani, Raz, & Rensink 
(2015) investigated the “Visual Riffle Force” in which spec-
tators are asked to visually select a card when the magician 
flips through the deck in front of their eyes—most specta-
tors choose the card which is the most visually salient. Both 
forces have high success rates and showed that participants 
felt free even when they chose the target card.
Magicians have developed a large assortment of forcing 
techniques that rely on a wide range of cognitive processes 
(Pailhès & Kuhn, 2019). In this paper, we examine a forcing 
technique that relies on population stereotypes: the Posi-
tion Force. This technique is based on the observation that 
people’s choices for random objects are influenced by the 
object’s physical position. According to the magic litera-
ture, people will be inclined to select the card that is the 
easiest to reach in the row (Banachek, 2002; Binet, 1894). 
This force is most commonly used with five playing cards 
(Banachek, 2002), but we decided to investigate the force 
with four cards to compare the results to forcing from our 
research program: here, the magician places four cards on 
the table in a horizontal row, after which the spectator is 
asked to select a card, by physically touching it. Results from 
an online survey on 91 magicians showed that most of them 
(68%) think that when we present four cards in a row on a 
table to spectators, the majority will choose the third card 
from their left. Their mean estimation of the percentage of 
people who would choose this target card was 57% of the 
spectators (SD = 15.9). Indeed, a recently published study 
from our laboratory using the Position Force found that 60% 
of the participants select the third card from their left while 
feeling free for their choice and underestimating the pro-
portion of people who would select the same card (Kuhn, 
Pailhès, & Lan, 2020) (Fig. 1).
Moreover, research in other domains suggests that peo-
ple’s choices are influenced by the physical positioning of 
an object.
Position effects
Nisbett and Wilson showed in 1977 that when presented 
with four identical pairs of stockings, people tend to pre-
fer the far-right one (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). Nowadays, 
consumer psychology (Chae & Hoegg, 2013), and nudge 
techniques (Dayan & Bar-Hillel, 2011) often rely on manip-
ulating an object’s physical positioning with the intention 
of influencing people’s behaviour and choices. For exam-
ple, people are more likely to choose an item, such as food 
(Kim, Hwang, Park, Lee, & Park, 2019), if it is positioned 
in a specific location, and this can be used to lead people 
Fig. 1  Representation of the Position Force in which the spectator/
participant selects the third card from his left by pushing it towards 
the magician/experimenter
Psychological Research 
1 3
towards healthier choices (Bucher et al., 2016). There are 
however some discrepancies about the exact way in which 
positioning affect people’s choices, with studies showing 
both edge advantage and aversion. Bar-Hillel suggests that 
these inconsistencies result from different choice character-
istics, such as whether it is interactive or not (Bar-Hillel, 
2015a). Accordingly, a choice is interactive when the pay-
off for someone’s decision is affected by another interested 
person. For example, in a game such as rock, paper, scis-
sors, each player’s choice payoff is determined by the joint 
choices of both players. A further factor involves the amount 
of cognitive processing a choice requires to figure it out. 
Situations in which all items are evidently identical (such as 
the back of playing cards) fall into the category of choices 
that neither require processing nor interaction. In this case, 
we observe that people present an edge aversion rather than 
edge advantage (Bar-Hillel, 2015a, b).
Indeed, when presented with a selection of similar 
options, or identical items, individuals tend to choose items 
located in the middle position rather than those located at the 
edges (Christenfeld, 1995). This effect has been found with 
a range of items. For example, participants prefer middle 
items and avoid items located at the extremes when choos-
ing among a row of arbitrary symbols, a toilet paper roll 
within a stall, a bathroom stall, and when picking products 
from shelves in supermarkets. The principle ruling these 
effects is thought to be based on a minimal mental effort 
(Christenfeld, 1995; Shaw, Bergen, Brown, & Gallagher, 
2000). Indeed, research showed that when participants are 
asked to choose between similar highlighters, survey papers, 
or seats, they reliably prefer the middle items (Shaw et al., 
2000). Bar-Hillel (2015a, b) notes that in such situations, it 
is not necessarily mental effort, but also physical one which 
is at play. The author further suggests that in these type of 
tasks, middle items are more reachable than those at the 
ends, because they are closer to the participants. Indeed, her 
principle of reachability dovetails this idea in that when all 
things are equal, people prefer objects that can be reached 
more easily. Accordingly, when people are presented with 
a horizontal physical display, their choice will be biased by 
this reachability principle, which might explain why they 
favour central items.
This behaviour, using a principle of least effort, is linked 
to dual-system theories of cognition (Chaiken, Liberman, & 
Eagly, 1989; Chen, Duckworth, & Chaiken, 1999; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, Frederick, 
Kahneman, & Frederick, 2001; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) 
which argue that most of the time we use automatic, rapid, 
stereotyped responses rather than controlled ones (Tomlin, 
Rand, Ludvig, & Cohen, 2015). Research on the psychology 
of the self suggests that one of the most important human 
characteristics is the ability to modify our responses and 
therefore remove ourselves from effects of situational stimuli 
(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). It has been shown that 
self-control requires attention and effort (Baumeister, 2002; 
Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & 
Chatzisarantis, 2010) and that one of the main functions 
of our reflective system is to control thoughts and actions 
suggested by our automatic, impulsive system (Kahneman, 
2011). Our System 1 (automatic type of thinking) is associ-
ated with greater use of diverse biases and heuristics, rather 
than our deliberative, reflective processes (Kahneman et al., 
2002). Therefore, encouraging people to reflect before mak-
ing a decision is expected to lead to lesser use of impulsive 
behaviours. Although there is some research examining the 
psychological factors that activate our automatic type of 
thinking (e.g. cognitive load and time pressure, Baumeister 
& Heatherton, 1996; Hwang, 1994; Vohs & Heatherton, 
2000), less is known about how to activate more deliberate 
decisions.
This paper seeks to document the Position Force, inves-
tigating its success rate and how free participants feel even 
when they are influenced by the trick. At the same time, 
we seek to investigate whether it is possible to encourage 
participants to make more deliberate choices, impairing the 
success of the force. In Experiment 1, we examine whether 
a simple change in phrasing, making the choice explicit, can 
lead to this effect.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 aimed to empirically examine how effec-
tive the Position Force is in terms of forcing participants to 
choose a target card, and to investigate whether the nature 
of the choice affects the extent to which participants choose 
the predicted item. Participants were either asked to sim-
ply push a card towards the experimenter (implicit choice), 
or they were explicitly asked to choose a card before the 
physical selection (explicit choice). Previous research shows 
that deliberative decision-making can be induced by simply 
framing tasks as decisions rather than intuitive reactions 
(Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007; Zhong, 2011). For 
example, participants were asked to “decide” rather than 
“to feel” to induce a deliberative decision (Zhong, 2011). 
Deliberative decisions are thought to lead to less reliance 
on heuristics and impulsive, automatic behaviours (Boureau, 
Sokol-Hessner, & Daw, 2015; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; 
Stanovich & West, 2000). We therefore predicted that partic-
ipants would be less likely to choose the target card (i.e. card 
that could be reached more easily) when they were encour-
aged to deliberately think about the choice (i.e. explicit 
choice) rather than when they made the selection implicitly. 
In line with previous research on the reachability bias (Bar-
Hillel, 2015a, b; Bar-Hillel, Peer, & Acquisti, 2014), we pre-
dicted that the force would only work for participants who 
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used their right hand to reach for the card, and thus it should 
be more effective for right-handed participants.
Our second objective was to examine the extent to which 
participants were aware of the force. To our knowledge, none 
of the previous studies on position effects and reachability 
has done this (though see Kuhn et al., 2020). Two key ele-
ments make a force successful: participants must select the 
target object, and this selection must feel free. Therefore, we 
assessed how free people felt about their choice and their 
awareness about the bias itself. Since the Position Force is 
commonly used in the context of a magic performance, we 
predicted that participants should feel free about their selec-
tion and that they are unaware of this behavioural bias.
Methods
Participants
One hundred participants (50 females, 50 males) between 18 
and 60 years old (M = 29.71, SD = 11.65) recruited on Gold-
smiths University campus took part in the experiment. Gold-
smiths Psychology Department provided ethical approval for 
the two experiments. Before the experiment and to maximize 
the power of our results, we ran an a priori power analysis 
for a Chi-squared test with w = 0.30 (moderate effect size), 
α = 0.05, and a power of 0.8. The output required 88 partici-
pants and the chosen effect size was based on prior results 
using the Position Force (Kuhn et al., 2020). We confirm that 
for both experiments, we report all measures, conditions and 
data exclusions.
Procedure
The experimenter/magician sat at one of Goldsmiths’ cafete-
ria table with the four cards already on the table, all spaced 
by approximately 5 cm, and positioned on the table in a way 
which made the row as symmetrical as possible. Participants 
sat to face the experimenter. Participants were randomly 
allocated to one of the two selection types (implicit choice 
or explicit choice) and consent forms presenting the experi-
ment as a study about magic tricks and decision-making 
were signed. In the implicit choice condition, participants 
were asked to “push a card toward [the experimenter]”. The 
procedure for the explicit choice condition was identical 
with the exception that they were instructed to “choose a 
card, and then push it toward [her]”.
The experimenter then noted the chosen card and the 
hand with which the participant pushed the card. The par-
ticipants were then asked to complete a questionnaire which 
asked them (1) how free they felt about their choice (from 
0, not free at all to 100 completely free), (2) the percentage 
of people they thought would have chosen the same card 
as them, and (3) the Dutch Handedness Questionnaire (van 
Strien, 2003).
Results and discussion
Efficiency of the force and main manipulation
The first analysis aimed to assess the efficiency of the Posi-
tion Force and the impact of the nature of the choice on 
participants’ selection. Figure 2 shows the percentages of 
participants who chose each of the four cards as a function of 
the nature of the choice and the hand that was used to make 
the selection. Eighteen percent of participants used their left 
hand, compared to 82% who used their right hand. Overall, 
55% of the participants chose the target card, which was the 
most chosen card, significantly more than chance (i.e. 25%) 
(X2 (1, N = 200) 18.75, p < 0.001, φ = 0.293). This result very 
closely matches the mean of magicians’ estimates (57%).
A visual inspection of the graphs illustrates a system-
atic difference in selections as a function of the hand used 
Fig. 2  Percentages of choices as 
a function of the experimental 
conditions and the hand used 
to make the selection. a The 
choices made by participants 
who used their left hand to push 
the card, b for those who used 
their right hand. Position 1 is 
the first card from the left of the 
participants
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to make the selection.1 Although the graph highlights clear 
differences in the success of the force as a function of hand 
selection, the difference did not reach statistical significance 
(X2 (3, N = 100) 3.95, p = 0.27, φ = 0.195). However, since 
only 18% of the participants used their left hand it is likely 
that non-significant difference is due to a lack of power. As 
we expected the force to work only when people used their 
right hand, we focused the rest of the analyses for the right-
handed selection only. Participants in the implicit choice 
condition were significantly more likely to choose the target 
card than those in the explicit choice condition (X2 (1, 82) 
4.32, p = 0.038, φ = 0.224). This suggests that as we pre-
dicted, people tend to act in a more deliberate way when they 
are reminded that they are making a decision.
Awareness of the force
Our next analysis examines the impact that the nature of the 
choice (explicit vs. implicit) and the choice itself (forced 
or not) has on people’s feeling about how free the choice 
was. Kruskal–Wallis tests show that neither the choice of 
card nor the selection method had an impact on participants’ 
feeling of freedom for their choice (H(1) = 1.77, p = 0.18 
and H(1) = 0.17, p = 0.68, see Fig. 3). This shows that par-
ticipants are unaware of their bias, as well as a dissociation 
between their behaviour and their conscious introspection.
Next, we examined participants’ metaknowledge of the 
bias by examining their estimates for the percentage of peo-
ple who would choose the same card. Kruskal–Wallis test 
shows that whatever card the participants chose, they did not 
give different estimations of the percentage of people who 
would choose the same card as they did (H(3)2.46, p = 0.48). 
Interestingly, participants who chose the target card under-
estimate the fact that they used a population stereotype, 
and the other participants overestimate the number of times 
their card would be chosen (see Fig. 4). This shows again 
Fig. 3  Mean feelings of free-
dom as a function of whether 
participants chose the target 
card or not (a) and of the 
experimental manipulation 
(b). Bars show 95% confidence 
intervals
Fig. 4  Participants’ estimations 
of the percentage of people 
who would have chosen the 
same card as they did, and the 
real data from our experiment. 
95% confidence interval bars 
are displayed for participants’ 
estimations
1 Participants who used their right hand to had a significantly higher 
handedness score (H(1) = 12.67, p < .001), which illustrates that the 
selection as typically made with the dominant hand.
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an important dissociation, this time between participants’ 
behaviour and their evaluation of others’.
These results suggest that the Position Force is effec-
tive—a large proportion of our participants chose the tar-
get card, while not being aware of their bias. This confirms 
Wegner’s theory (Wegner, 2002a, b), showing that people 
tend not to have access to the real causes of their behaviours, 
which are often unconsciously rooted. Here, most partici-
pants’ decision seems to have been guided by the position 
of the card while they underestimated the number of people 
who would have made the same decision. A simple change 
in phrasing negatively impacted the success of the Force. 
This suggests that participants rely less on automatic/impul-
sive biases when asked to choose before acting. Handedness 
also plays a role in this force—the force only worked when 
people used their right hand. The results confirm previous 
literature about reachability and edge aversion when pre-
sented items are identical, as participants favoured items 
which were easier to reach according to the hand their used 
while avoiding the cards at the ends of the row.
Experiment 2
The second experiment aimed to replicate the results from 
Experiment 1 and confirm whether explicitly informing 
people about the choice before their selection would impair 
people’s stereotypical behaviour. This time, rather than let-
ting people use their preferred hand, we forced them to use 
their right hand by restricting the use of their left hand. We 
used this experiment to test a controversial idea in embodied 
cognition which suggests that the nature in which they are 
asked to hold an object influences the level of self-control 
they have over their actions. This idea is based on the obser-
vation that people may clench their fists, tense their mus-
cles or grit their teeth when firming willpower, and argues 
that such actions could also help us firm willpower and 
consequently improve self-control (Hung & Labroo, 2010; 
Niedenthal & Barsalou, 2005). Past research on embodied 
cognition shows that participants’ self-control is enhanced 
when they firmly grasp an object while making a choice 
(Hung & Labroo, 2011; Niedenthal & Barsalou, 2005). 
The explanation behind these findings is that our memories 
would be composed of multimodal experiences, which also 
spread throughout our body. One consequence of this would 
therefore be that bodily actions accompanying thoughts 
could generate the associated cognitions and influence our 
behaviours (Briñol & Petty, 2003; Cacioppo, Priester, & 
Berntson, 1993). If true, it predicts that participants would 
experience greater self-control, therefore choosing the tar-
get card less often when they were asked to firmly grasp a 
glue stick rather than simply hold it. Finally, we decided to 
investigate participants’ sense of freedom more thoroughly, 
using Thompson’s 3 components of a free choice (Thomp-
son, Locander, & Pollio, 1990): being deliberate, in control, 
and free from restriction.
Methods
Participants
One hundred participants (59 females, 40 males, 1 non-
binary) between 18 and 65 years old (M = 30.19, SD = 11.73) 
recruited on Goldsmiths University campus took part in the 
experiment.
Procedure
The experiment took place at the same venue, with the same 
setting at Goldsmiths University, where the participants were 
recruited. This time, every participant was asked to hold a 
glue stick in their left hand. The experimenter either asked 
them (while doing the gesture herself) to simply hold the 
glue stick in their open palm or to firmly grasp it between 
their fingers and their palm.
As in Experiment 1, participants were randomly allo-
cated to one of the selection conditions and either asked to 
“choose a card and then push it towards [the experimenter]” 
(explicit choice), or to “push a card towards [the experi-
menter]” (implicit choice). Participants were then asked to 
put the glue stick down and answer the paper questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was composed of 0–100 scale questions 
about their feeling of freedom (“How free did you feel for 
your choice?”), its three components (“How restricted did 
you feel for your choice?” “How impulsive/deliberate did 
you feel in making your choice?” and “How much control 
did you feel you had over your choice of card?”), as well as 
two measures about how firmly and tightly they felt their 
hand while making the choice to ensure they did tense their 
muscles more in the self-control condition. Finally, their 
writing hand, gender and age were also recorded.
Results and discussion
Efficiency of the force and main manipulations
Our first analysis tested the efficiency of the Position Force 
and our two main manipulations. Figure 5 shows the per-
centages of participants who chose each of the four cards as 
a function of the two experimental manipulations.
Overall, 48/100 chose the target card, which was the most 
frequently chosen one. Comparing our results to a random 
distribution (25% choice per card), a Chi-squared showed 
that our participants chose the target card significantly 
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more often than the others (X2 (1, 200) 11.41, p < 0.001, 
φ = 0.232).
Regarding the experimental conditions, participants 
chose the target card significantly less often in the explicit 
choice condition than in the implicit choice condition (36% 
vs 60% of choices, X2 (1, 100) 5.77, p = 0.016, φ = 0.234). 
This confirms that when participants are forced to use their 
right hand to make their choice, and therefore when the 
most convenient card to choose is indeed the forced one, 
the phrasing of the choice does have an impact on whether 
or not participants use a stereotypical answer. It appears that 
simply using the sentence “choose a card, and then push it 
towards me” rather than just “push a card towards me” subtly 
make the choice more salient and explicit, therefore activat-
ing a more deliberative process in participants’ decision. 
However, no significant difference was found regarding the 
effect of embodied self-control (X2 (1, 100) 1.44, p = 0.23, 
φ = 0.119), even though participants did feel their hand 
muscles were significantly tighter (W = 1954, p < 0.001) 
and firmer (W = 1980, p < 0.001) when they were asked to 
firmly grasp the glue stick rather than simply hold it. Several 
explanations seem possible in regard of these null results. 
First, studies using this type of procedure have suggested 
that firmly clasping an object could enhance self-regulation 
and control (e.g. withstand pain, overcome food temptation, 
consume unpleasant medicines). But we cannot rule out the 
possibility that this does not apply to the current specific 
situation. It is also possible that the present study does not 
necessitate participants to use their self-control to choose a 
card other than the forced one, and therefore an enhanced 
self-control would not affect the results. However, embodied 
cognition theories have also suffered from important criti-
cism regarding their grounding in theoretical background, 
and several papers have put in doubt the validity of research 
on the subject (Caramazza, Anzellotti, Strnad, & Lingnau, 
2014; Goldinger, Papesh, Barnhart, Hansen, & Hout, 2016; 
Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) or lack of replication (e.g. 
Chabris, Heck, Mandart, Benjamin, & Simons, 2019). It has 
been pointed out that within most experiments on embodied 
cognition, the expected behaviours tended to be overarching 
ones (e.g. completing a task), and our study was probably 
looking for a more specific outcome (Goldinger et al., 2016).
Feeling of freedom
First, regarding the overall general sense of freedom, partici-
pants felt significantly freer in the explicit choice condition 
than in the implicit one (W = 1540, p = 0.034, rpb = 0.232, see 
Fig. 6). No significant difference was found for the embodied 
self-control variable (W = 1330, p = 0.56, rpb = 0.064). Tak-
ing a closer look at the components of the feeling of free-
dom (Fig. 6), participants felt significantly more free from 
restrictions when the choice was explicit (M = 80.06) rather 
than implicit (M = 66.52, H(1) = 6.63, p = 0.01). No other 
significant result was found regarding either the self-control 
variable or the other components of freedom (i.e. the feeling 
of control and deliberation).
The mean of the feelings of control, restriction and delib-
eration was correlated with the general feeling of freedom 
(rs = 0.619, p < 0.001, see Table 1). However, the feeling of 
deliberation did not seem to correlate with those of control, 
restriction, and general freedom. A calculation of Cron-
bach’s alpha appeared to be only 0.34 for the three items 
but went up to 0.60 if the item of the feeling of deliberation 
was removed. It then appears that contrary to Thompson’s 
definition (1990), the feeling of deliberation is not a reliable 
component of people’s general feeling of freedom.
Finally, we looked at how the feeling of freedom and its 
components were linked to participants’ choice of card. Results 
of the logistic regression indicated that there was no signifi-
cant association between participants’ feeling of freedom, 
restriction, control and their choice of cards (X2(95) = 4.93, 
p = 0.295). However, the feeling of deliberation was signifi-
cantly associated with the participants’ choices (p = 0.045). 
Fig. 5  Percentages of choice 
for each card depending on 
the choice conditions (a) and 
embodied self-control condition 
(b). Position 1 is the first card 
from the left of the participants
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Indeed, the more participants felt their decision was deliber-
ate, the more likely they were to choose another card than 
the forced one. During debriefings, participants who did not 
choose the target card typically reported first thinking about 
taking it and then changing their mind for another card.
In summary, this experiment replicated experiment 1, 
showing that most participants tend to choose the target card 
and that the Position Force is extremely effective. We con-
firmed that the nature of the choice has an impact on whether 
they choose the target card or make a more deliberate choice 
and go for another one.
Moreover, the more participants felt their choice was 
deliberate, the less likely they were to choose the target card. 
Also, participants felt less restricted and more generally free 
when they were asked to “choose” a card (explicit choice) 
rather than simply “push” it (implicit choice). However, the 
embodied self-control variable did not show to have any 
impact on any measure.
General discussion
This paper sought to document the Position Force, as well as 
investigate whether it was possible to lead people to act more 
deliberately when making a simple decision. For this, we 
used a subtle change in the phrasing of the choice, making 
it either explicit or implicit (Experiment 1 and 2), as well as 
a controversial idea in embodied cognition (Experiment 2).
Position Force’s efficiency and choice variable
Both experiments confirmed that the Position Force is effi-
cient and replicate previous results (Kuhn, Pailhès & Lan 
2020), with an overall 52% of participants choosing the tar-
get card (the third one from participants’ left). These results 
closely match the mean of magicians’ estimates (57%) and 
demonstrate that magicians’ intuition about the effectiveness 
of the force is pretty accurate and precise. Our results further 
show that a position effect influences people’s choice, and 
they clearly illustrate an edge aversion effect, which dove-
tails previous findings that have used identical items (Bar-
Hillel, 2015a, b; Christenfeld, 1995). It is interesting to note 
that some other related forcing techniques might rely on this 
principle as well. Dai Vernon’s five cards force is thought 
to rely on reverse psychology and five cards are placed in a 
horizontal row with the target card located fourth from the 
left. In this force, five cards are carefully chosen, namely 
the king of hearts, seven of clubs, ace of diamonds, four of 
hearts and nine of diamonds (from left to right). The spec-
tator is primed to be suspicious as the magician insists the 
Fig. 6  General feeling of 
freedom and its components as 
a function of the experimen-
tal conditions. Bars are 95% 
confidence intervals for each 
condition
Table 1  Spearman correlations 
with the three components of 
freedom, their mean and the 
general sense of freedom
The item for the feeling of restriction was reverse (on a scale from 0 to 100, 100 was completely free from 
restrictions)
***p < 0.001
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
1. Deliberation —
2. Control 0.069 —
3. Restriction 0.074 0.537*** —
4.. M 1, 2, 3 0.623*** 0.690*** 0.704*** —
5. General freedom 0.137 0.525*** 0.684*** 0.619*** —
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selection must be a free choice and points out that the ace 
is in the middle and the seven is the only black card. These 
statements are thought to eliminate these two cards as they 
were mentioned. The two last cards are situated at the end of 
the row, and the king is the only picture card which is sug-
gested to make it suspicious. As stated by Banachek (2002), 
the four of hearts is more likely to be chosen as it is not at 
the end of the spread and is in the fourth position. It would 
be interesting to investigate whether this force truly relies on 
reverse psychology, or simply on the position of the card—
again seemingly the most reachable one.
The two experiments also showed that asking partici-
pants to make an explicit decision impairs the success of the 
Force. When participants were asked to choose a card and 
then push it rather than simply push it, they chose the target 
card less often. These results suggest that the subtle change 
in the presentation of the choice resulted in less automatic, 
and more deliberate choices. Therefore, it seems that making 
a choice explicit leads to a less automatic, impulsive deci-
sion: a more deliberate one.
Awareness of the bias
Experiment 1 investigated participants’ awareness of their 
bias, asking them to estimate what percentage of people 
would have chosen the same card as they did in the same 
situation. The results show that participants’ choice of card 
had no impact on their estimation. Across the four differ-
ent types of choices (the four cards), participants estimated 
that between 33 and 43% of other people would choose the 
same card as theirs. Participants who chose the target card 
underestimated the fact that their choice was a population 
stereotype, their mean estimation being 40%, compared to 
the 55% of participants who chose the identical item. How-
ever, participants who did not choose the target card, gave 
overestimations of the frequency of other people’s choices. 
The mean of their estimations across the three cards was 
38% compared 15% who chose these cards. This adds to 
previous literature in choice blindness and highlights a dis-
sociation between our behaviour and our conscious intro-
spection (Hall, Johansson, Tärning, Sikström, & Deutgen, 
2010; Hall et al., 2013; McLaughlin & Somerville, 2013). 
As Wegner noted, the actual causal paths of an action are not 
present in the person’s consciousness, and the experience of 
conscious will arises as we infer this path from our thought 
to our action (Wegner, 2002a, b). According to his theory, 
we unconsciously decide upon an outcome, and if this deci-
sion coincides with our conscious intention, we experience 
having made this choice independent of the unconscious 
processing. This phenomenon appears to be what happened 
in the implicit choice condition: most participants used an 
automatic behaviour influenced by external factors (position 
and reachability effects), but were not consciously aware of 
these influenced, underestimating the number of people who 
would have chosen the same card as they did.
Feeling of freedom
We also measured participants’ general sense of freedom for 
their choice (Experiment 1 and 2) as well as its three com-
ponents (Experiment 2) according to Thompson’s definition 
(Thompson et al., 1990). Participants’ feelings of delibera-
tion, restriction, and control for their choice were measured, 
alongside their general feeling of freedom. Regarding the 
general sense of freedom across both experiments, partici-
pants’ choice of card did not have any significant impact. 
This shows that whether people were influenced by the force 
or not, they felt the same degree of freedom for their choice. 
As Binet already noted (Binet, 1894), “each individual 
placed in certain conditions, and thinking to be acting freely, 
is, in reality, behaving in the same way as other individuals, 
and what they have in common is automatic activity” (p. 
151). This adds to previous results regarding people’s aware-
ness of their bias, and support the choice blindness literature, 
showing that people tend to be blind to the reasons for their 
choice (Hall et al., 2010; Johansson, Hall, Sikström, Tärn-
ing, & Lind, 2006; Rieznik et al., 2017).
However, participants felt their choice was more deliber-
ate when they did not choose the target card. The feeling of 
deliberation was the only component which was not cor-
related with the general sense of freedom or its other two 
components. During the debriefing, participants who did not 
choose the target card typically reported first thinking about 
taking it and then changing their mind for another one. This 
suggests that people can be aware of their metacognition 
about their choice, while still being blind to why they are 
acting in the way they do.
Towards freer choices?
Our results highlight important new pathways to explore 
the nature of free will. If people can become aware of their 
metacognition about their decisions, they can inhibit their 
initial impulsive and automatic behaviour and decide not 
to act upon them. Baumeister, notes that one needs to go 
through an inner process of choosing for free will to be rel-
evant. He describes how the role of free will would be to 
alter the flow of our behaviour, and how “the capacity for 
rational thought and decision-making lies atop an irrational, 
impulsive beast, and so it only sometimes can alter the cause 
of action that that impulsive beast will take” (p. 71).
Dovetailing this idea, our results suggest that we should 
refocus the debate on determinism vs. free will and frame 
the latter in terms of degrees. Baumeister linked free will 
and dual-process theories of human mental functioning by 
pointing out that free will could be mainly associated with 
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what is called System 2, or the cognitive processes involving 
conscious and controlled activity rather than the noncon-
scious and automatic one associated with System 1 (2002). 
Investigating freedom in terms of autoregulation and self-
control might help us find ways to conquer these degrees 
of freedom of choice. Such empirical findings may help us 
understand the mechanisms that underpin our reasoning and 
help us make more deliberate choices, rather than simply 
acting on habits and automatic behaviours. This research 
may help us find concrete and practical ways to enhance our 
deliberate and rational cognitive processes. Our paper sug-
gests that simply making people more aware that they are 
making a decision could be one efficient solution.
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